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Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism
Jamal Greene†

Abstract
This Article considers the future of originalism in the wake
of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v.
Heller . It argues that, although Heller is in many ways a triumph
for proponents of originalism, it might also represent a high water
mark for the doctrine and for the political movement that supports
it. There is little reason to believe that the cases of relative first
impression that originalism feeds on will be readily available in
the near future, and the politics of the Court and of the country do
not augur the appointment of additional originalist judges. These
observations recommend that progressive advocates focus on
availing themselves of the nation’s ethical shift to themes of
change and mutual responsibility, so as to emphasize the
Constitution’s dynamic future rather than its static past .

INTRODUCTION
Has originalism won? It’s easy to think so, judging from some of the
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision last Term in District of Columbia v.
Heller. 1 The Heller Court held that the District of Columbia could neither ban
possession of handguns nor require that all other firearms be either unloaded and
disassembled or guarded by a trigger lock. In finding for the first time in the
Court’s history that a gun control law violated the Second Amendment, Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the 5-4 majority appeared to be a sterling exemplar of
originalism, the method of constitutional interpretation that he has helped to
popularize. More surprising to most observers, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Stevens also seemed to be in the originalist tradition. 2 Hence the claim advanced
by some in the decision’s wake that “we are all originalists now.” 3
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1
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2
Id . at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3
See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The
Current Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility
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If that claim is true, it is profoundly important to the future of
constitutional law. Originalists believe that judges generally should prioritize the
original understanding of constitutional provisions over contemporary
understandings that avail themselves of social and intellectual progress. Since this
is not how constitutional law has been made for much of our history, a serious
commitment by the Supreme Court to originalism would destabilize some of our
most familiar and cherished political traditions. If the claim is not true, then
constitutional lawyers, particularly progressives, must take care to separate the
rhetoric of originalists from the impact of originalism on actual constitutional
cases.
This Essay argues that the claim is not true and then some. Not only are
we not all originalists now, but very few of us are originalists now. Of course, a
handful of judges and many legal academics (more than ever, perhaps) maintain a
theoretical devotion to some version of originalism. But in practice, originalism is
most useful in two categories of cases. The first category comprises cases of
constitutional first impression. But now that Heller has laid the foundations of
Second Amendment doctrine, this category describes a virtual null set. The
second category includes those issues that the political movement behind the
recent originalist revival has tagged as vulnerable to attack on originalist grounds:
abortion, religious establishment, limitations on capital punishment, and so forth.
The problem here is that the doctrinal cobwebs surrounding these issues are too
thick for originalism’s blade. So long as the only originalists of influence feel
constrained by stare decisis, originalism will remain more rallying cry than
decision procedure.
Blurring these distinctions has been vital to the strategy that has made
originalism relevant to our constitutional politics. Recognizing them will likewise
be vital to progressives’ efforts to commandeer those politics in favor of their own
constitutional ends. This Essay describes the past and present of originalism in
order to glimpse its future. Part I defines originalism and discusses its history in
Clause, 157 U. PA. L. RE V . PENNUM BR A 134, 135 (2008), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=19
pdfs/GreatDivorce.pdf; Dave Kopel, Conservative Activists Key to D.C. Handgun Decision ,
HUM AN E VEN TS , June 27, 2008, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27229; Heller on a
First Read, Posting of Dale Carpenter to the Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008, 17:03 EST); see also Adam Winkler,
Heller’s Catch -22 , 56 UCLA L. RE V. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, on file with the
Harvard Law School Library) (citing Linda Greenhouse’s reference to Heller as a “triumph of
originalism”); Dahlia Lithwick, The Dark Matter of Our Cherished Document: What You See in
the Constitution Isn’t What You Get, SL ATE , Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2204377/
(“The liberals and conservatives [in Heller] took turns trying to outdo one another as ‘textualists’
and ‘originalists’ and ‘strict constructionists.’”).
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case law and political rhetoric. That history exposes originalism as an otherwise
plausible interpretive methodology that has been radicalized and weaponized by
conservative activists over the last three decades. Part II discusses the Court’s
opinion in Heller and explains why originalism will not likely be relevant to the
doctrinal exposition of the Second Amendment going forward. Heller reveals
both the potency and the weaknesses of originalism. The opinion could not have
been written thirty years ago, but it is difficult to conceive of an analogously
originalist opinion being written anytime soon. Part III elaborates several reasons
why. Originalist judges—particularly those who feel relatively unconstrained by
precedent—are unlikely appointees to the Supreme Court for the foreseeable
future. Moreover, the sorts of legal issues that the Court’s agenda will likely
comprise are poor candidates for originalist appeals. In short, even if Heller is a
triumph for originalism, it might also be its high water mark. Part III concludes,
then, with a prescription for progressive lawyers to reemphasize the
Constitution’s dynamic potential and to let originalism fade, for the moment, into
history.

I. THE H ISTORY OF ORIGINALISM
The historian of originalism must proceed with an ironic caution.
Originalism means different things to different people and in different times.
Deciphering what one means by “originalism” first requires deciding whether it
refers to the views of politicians or constitutional lawyers, to academic theory or
judicial practice, to the 1980s or the present decade, and to law or linguistics.
Each combination of points along those spectra describes a different idea with a
distinct intellectual history. The irony within the caution becomes apparent when
one considers the little common ground among most originalists: that the meaning
of the Constitution is fixed at a historical moment in time and is available to
interpreters. Nevertheless, if we marry that view to the corollary that judges in
constitutional cases should make their best efforts to discern and apply that fixed
meaning, we have a working definition nearly adequate to the present task.4
An originalist opinion is not merely one in which the outcome of the case
is consistent with the original understanding. By that definition, virtually all
judges and many—if not most—opinions would qualify: emphasis on consistency
with historical understandings is a relevant and persuasive form of American
4

The many efforts to construct a definitive taxonomy of originalism have been h eroic
and, inevitably, contradictory. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for
the Perplexed , 49 OHIO S T. L.J. 1085, 1086–1087 (1989); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is
Bunk , 84 N.Y.U. L. R E V. 1, 8–37 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2–12
(Illinois Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Paper No. 07 -24, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
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constitutional argument.5 Rather, an originalist opinion is one whose result is
compelling solely or primarily because of that consistency. And an originalist
judge is one who is committed to originalist opinions, who believes that such
opinions would predominate in the best of worlds.
An additional distinction is necessary to make the historical inquiry
intelligible. Most academic lawyers draw a sharp line between original public
meaning and original subjective intent. The Framers of the Constitution had
various expectations as to the meaning and scope of particular constitutional
provisions; those expectations might not only have differed internally —between
Alexander Hamilton and Charles Pinckney, say—but might have diverged from
how the Constitution’s audience would have reasonably understood those
provisions. Most academic originalists insist that the latter, the original public
meaning of the Constitution, is the relevant object of interpretation because the
Constitution became legally binding through the actions of its ratifiers, not its
framers. 6
There is little evidence that even well-educated and legally trained
members of the public appreciate the distinction between original meaning and
original intent,7 but it is difficult to assess the status of originalism at the nation’s
founding without confronting this difference. The members of the founding
generation were not original-intent originalists, as that category is now understood.
As H. Jefferson Powell detailed in his classic treatment, Revolutionary views on
constitutional interpretation arose from a competing set of norms—an antiinterpretation bias derived from British Protestantism and the Enlightenment, and
the evolutionary norms of a common law approach to statutory interpretation.8
Neither of those traditions looked favorably upon vesting the subjective intentions
of statutory drafters with legal authority. To be sure, one frequently finds
reference to the “intention of the lawgiver” and similar formulations in eighteenth
and nineteenth century British and American judicial opinions and treatises. But

5

See PHILIP BOBBITT , CONS TITU TION AL FATE 9–24 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation , 100 HAR V. L. RE V . 1189, 1198–
99 (1987).
6

See ROBER T H. BO RK , THE TEM P TING OF AM ERIC A: THE POLITIC AL SEDUC TION OF

THE

L AW 143-44 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Second -Order Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. RE V. 2867,
2871 (2007).
7
See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO . L.J. 657, 687 –88 (2009) (describing the
public reaction to Heller, much of which conflated original intent and original meaning).
8
See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 888 –902 (1985).
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that intention was generally considered intrinsic to the text itself; it was not to be
gleaned from extrinsic sources such as legislative debate or drafting notes.9
By contrast, the intellectual presuppositions of the Revolutionary
generation fit quite comfortably with the notion that the original meaning of the
enacted text should be dispositive. The Framers were what one might call dated
textualists; they intended the express meaning of the Constitution’s words to hold
sway for later interpreters, regardless of social change. 10
That the founding generation shared this interpretive premise with many
modern originalists does not in itself link the present originalism movement to
ancient hermeneutic tradition. Many of the great contemporary debates between
originalists and their opponents do not reflect differences over original meaning
so much as differences over present-day application. As Ronald Dworkin
observed in his well known colloquy with Justice Scalia, many of the
Constitution’s trouble spots, such as “cruel and unusual punishment” and “due
process of law,” refer to principles that the founding generation —drafters and
audience alike—would have considered compatible with dynamic application.11
There is little evidence, for example, that a late eighteenth century reasonable
person would have understood “liberty” as incapable in principle of
encompassing a right to have an abortion.12
Nonetheless, we should hesitate before ascribing to founding-era
Americans a Dworkinian view of the the level of generality at which future
interpreters should understand constitutional text. Those Americans would not
have contemplated—nor can they be presumed to have consented to —an evolving
Constitution that safeguards an ever expanding set of individual rights against the
government. The disputes over individual rights that form Dworkin’s paradigm
cases were largely foreign to the docket of the early Court. Most of the Bill of
Rights was inapplicable to the states until well into the twentieth century and, as
Mark Graber writes, the federal law docket of the antebellum Supreme Court was
largely restricted to “politically uncontroversial land cases, technical questions of

9

PHILIP A. H AM BURGE R , L AW AND JUD ICIAL DU TY 298–301 (2008); Powell, supra note
8, at 894 –96. But see JOSEP H S TOR Y, COM M EN TARIE S ON THE CONS TITU TION OF THE UN ITED
S TATES § 400 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833).
10
See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88
MICH . L. RE V. 239, 325 (1989). I borrow the “dated” formulation from Ronald Dworkin, who calls
Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism by the same name. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in
AN TON IN SC AL IA, A M ATTER OF IN TE RP RETATION : FEDER AL COUR TS AN D THE L AW 115, 121
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
11
See Dworkin, supra note 10, at 119 –23.
12
See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning , 24 CONST. COM M EN T. 291, 311–
12 (2007). I leave aside the question of whether the relevant audience belongs to the original
founding generation or the Reconstruction era.
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federal jurisdiction, and other issues of similar political insignificance.” 13 In that
context, John Marshall’s famous dictum that the Constitution is “intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs” 14 is best understood as counseling judicial restraint, not judicially
engineered constitutional adaptation.
Indeed, Marshall’s statements in other cases seem sympathetic with
modern originalist premises. In declaring section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
unconstitutional in Marbury v. Madison, Marshall wrote, “The constitution is
either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a
level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it.” 15 Later, dissenting in Ogden v. Saunders,
Marshall defended his view that the Contracts Clause should apply to prospective
as well as retrospective legislation:

To say that the intention of the [Constitution] must prevail; that
this intention must be collected from its words; that its words are to
be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by
those for whom the instrument was intended; that its provisions are
neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to objects
not comprehended in them, nor contemplated by its framers;—is to
repeat what has been already said more at large, and is all that can
be necessary.16
Justice Scalia could hardly have said it better himself. Similar expressions of the
view that the Constitution should be understood in contemporary times as it was
understood at the founding can be found in numerous other nineteenth century
cases.17 It is for this reason that many originalists, including Scalia and Robert
Bork, have concluded that as originalists they are engaged in a project of
constitutional restoration rather than a radical departure from settled practice. 1 8
To whatever extent a version of originalism was the settled practice in the
nineteenth century, it began to be unsettled around the turn of the twentieth
13

Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53
VAND . L. RE V. 73, 116 (2000).
14
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
15
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
16
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
17
See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558 (1895); Ex Parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857); see also
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1905) (“The Constitution is a written
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now.”).
18
See BORK , supra note 6, at 143; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
CIN. L. RE V. 849, 852 –54 (1989).
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century. Progressive era academics such as Abbott Lawrence Lowell and, later,
Woodrow Wilson analogized government to an organism, rejecting the
Newtonian notion of government as a machine.1 9 Language co mparing the
Constitution to a living creature peppers the judicial opinions of Justices Holmes
and Brandeis and the writings of Benjamin Cardozo.2 0 Those judges, along with
Harlan Fiske Stone, formed the intellectual core of the New Deal Court that
eventually freed states to pursue labor regulations and permitted President
Roosevelt and his Democratic Congresses to revolutionize the administrative state.
The most prominent originalist opinions of the 1930s—Justice Sutherland’s
writings in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell21 and West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish2 2 —were in dissent.
Originalism remained firmly on the margins of constitutional law for the
next four decades. With the notable exception of Hugo Black, no justice of the
Supreme Court and few prominent legal academics were self-avowed originalists
for most of that period. That is not to say that there were no Supreme Court
majority opinions that relied on the authority of original intent, nor is it to say that
members of the bench and bar considered the original understanding of
constitutional provisions irrelevant to the interpretive exercise. There would
otherwise have been no need for the Court to request additional briefing on the
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause after the first argument in
Brown v. Board of Education .23 But in conspicuously disregarding evidence that
the Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment did not anticipate it being
read to mandate school desegregation, 24 the Brown Court foreshadowed an era in
which a contrary original understanding proved no significant obstacle to results
that the Justices believed fundamental justice required.
The Warren Court had its critics, of course, prominently including Felix
Frankfurter disciples such as Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland, 25 but attacks
19

See A. L AW R ENCE LOW ELL , ESS AYS ON GO VERNM EN T 1–4 (1889); WOODROW
WIL SON , THE NEW FREE DOM : A CALL FOR THE EM ANC IP ATION OF THE GENERO US ENERG IES O F A
PEOP LE 46–48 (1913); see also MICH AEL K AM M EN , A M ACH INE TH AT WOULD GO OF ITSELF : THE
CONSTITU TION IN AM ER IC AN CUL TU RE 19–20 (1986).
20
See, e.g., Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); BENJAM IN N. C ARDO ZO ,
THE N ATU RE OF THE JUD ICIAL PROCESS 17 (photo. reprint 1998) (1921).
21
290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures against a
Contracts Clause challenge).
22
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage statute and overruling Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
23
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972–73 (1953).
24
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
25
See ALEX ANDER M. B ICKEL , TH E SUP REM E COUR T AND THE ID E A OF PROGRE SS 45−47
(Yale Univ. Press 1978) (1970); PHILIP KURL AND , POL ITICS , THE CONS TITU TION , AND THE
W ARREN COUR T , at xx−xxii (1970).
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on its work did not typically take originalist form prior to the publication of Raoul
Berger’s Government by Judiciary in 1976. Richard Nixon campaigned in 1968
on the promise of appointing “strict constructionists” to the Court,26 but by that
term he meant only that he sought “men that interpret the law and don’t try to
make the law.” 27 So defined, “strict constructionism” begs the question and is
therefore useless jurisprudentially. Originalism was far more promising. Altho ugh
Berger described himself as a liberal, his book’s sharp, hyperbolic critiques of the
Warren Court for diverging from the original intentions of the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment dramatically reinvigorated the academic debate over
originalism.
Armed with a coherent judicial philosophy and abetted by the election of
Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980, the originalism -promoting Federalist
Society was formed in 1982 and the conservative Center for Judicial Studies
opened the following year. The Center published an influential bimonthly journal
called Benchmark, which would “subscribe[] to the maxim that Rule of Law
demands adherence to the original intent of the Constitution.”28 On the left,
scholars such as Powell, John Hart Ely, and Paul Brest attacked originalism as
simplistic, prone to anachronistic thinking, inconsistent with the text and history
of the document itself, and dangerously sanguine about the capacity of judges to
do the work of historians.29
The debate reached a thunderous crescendo in 1987 over then -Circuit
Judge Robert Bork’s failed Supreme Court nomination. At the start of Reagan’s
second term, Edwin Meese III had taken over as Attorney General. Almost
immediately, in a series of speeches, Meese announced that the Justice
Department would devote itself to “a jurisprudence of original intention.”3 0
Consistent with that program, Bork refused during his confirmation hearings to
back down from his views that not only Roe v. Wade, 31 but also Griswold v.
Connecticut32 and Bolling v. Sharpe33 (among other staples) were incorrectly

26

See THOM AS M. K ECK , THE MOS T AC TIVIS T SUP REM E COUR T IN H IS TOR Y 111–13

(2004).
27

Id. at 112.
James McClellan, Editor’s Brief, BENCHM ARK : A BIM ON TH L Y REP OR T ON THE
CONSTITU TION , Fall 1983, at 1.
29
See JOHN H AR T EL Y, DEM OCR AC Y AND DIS TRUS T: A THEO R Y OF JUD IC IAL RE VIEW
11−41 (1980); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding , 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 229 –34 (1980); Powell, supra note 8, at 885–88.
30
Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution , 27 S. TEX . L. RE V. 455, 465 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
31
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32
318 U.S. 479 (1965).
33
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
28
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decided or reasoned.34 Notice that by this point in our story the originalists’ cause
had become unmoored from that of the prudentialists—those who, like Bickel and
Kurland, opposed the Warren Court for proceeding too dramatically, too
haphazardly, and without sufficient attention to settled expectations or public
support.35 By 1987, originalists had little affection for stare decisis. And there was
sense in this. The Warren Court had altered the status quo of constitutional law;
as cases like Griswold , Reynolds v. Sims,36 and Miranda v. Arizona3 7 developed
cultural resonance and social reliance, the argument from continuity, once so
powerful, became less available to the originalism movement that those cases
spawned.
Relatively overlooked during the dust-up over the Bork nomination (and
the controversial elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice the year prior)
was the 1986 nomination and appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court. Perhaps
no one bears greater responsibility for the current prominence of originalism in
case law and political and legal discourse than Scalia. It is frequently remarked
that Scalia has suffered from the sharpness of his dissenting pen, which has been
blamed for his inability to build coalitions among his colleagues and in particular
for his alienation from Justice O’Connor.38 But that very sharpness has conspired
with Scalia’s equally witty academic writings, his frequent lectures, his feistiness
during oral argument, his affable personality off the bench, and the prominence of
his pulpit to create a cult of personality around him.39 Rush Limbaugh has called
Scalia the person “whose brain I would like if I didn’t have mine.”40 Charles
Krauthammer has written, “Some people have John Grisham. Others Tom Clancy.
Not me. For sheer power, stiletto prose and verbal savagery, I’ll take Antonin
Scalia.” 41 In 2004, former Republican lobbyist Kevin Ring published a
sycophantic compilation of Scalia’s most memorable dissents entitled Scalia
Dissents: Writings of the Supreme Court’s Wittiest, Most Outspoken Justice;42 the

34

See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 115, 184−85, 286−87
(1987).
35
Indeed, Kurland surprised many in opposing Bork’s nomination to the Court.
36
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38
See JEFFRE Y ROSEN , THE SUP REM E COUR T: THE PER SON ALITIE S AND RIVALRIES TH AT
DEFINED AM ERIC A 199−200 (2007); JEFFRE Y TOO BIN , THE NINE : IN SIDE THE SECRE T WO RLD OF
THE SUP REM E COUR T 55 − 56, 191 −92, 317 −18 (2007).
39
See Greene, supra note 7, at 710.
40
Rush Limbaugh, Limbaugh Fundamentals: What is Originalism? , THE L IM B AUGH
LE TTE R (Dec. 2005), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/limfunoriginalism.guest.html.
41
Charles Krauthammer, Supreme Hypocrisy, W ASH . POS T, Jun. 30, 2000, at A31.
42
KEVIN R ING , SC AL IA DISSEN TS : WR ITINGS O F THE SUP REM E COUR T’S W ITTIES T, MOS T
OUTSP OKEN JUS TICE (2004). The inside cover reads: “Brilliant. Colorful. Visionary. Tenacious.
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book was well received in conservative circles.43 George W. Bush called Scalia
(along with Clarence Thomas) one of the two justices he most admired. Even
Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has said that Justice Scalia would
be an acceptable Chief Justice because “I disagree with many of the results that he
arrives at, but his reason[s] for arriving at those results are very hard to dispute.”44
Scalia has been originalism’s social entrepreneur par excellence, and his
mark can be seen not just in politics and conservative popular culture but in the
legal academy and, most recently, in actual Court opinions. Justice Scalia’s
relatively early emphasis on original meaning rather than original intent provided,
for some, a decisive rebuttal to the criticisms of Brest and Powell, and it has
helped to drive the latter formulation to the fringes of the legal academy.45 And
although Scalia’s originalist appeals were usually in dissent during his early years
on the Court,46 the majority has used originalist arguments to overrule
longstanding precedents or to alter settled understandings several times in recent
years.
For example, Justice Scalia wrote for the 5–4 majority in Printz v. United
Stat es that, based in part on the original assumptions of the founding era, the
federal government could not direct state executive officers to enforce federal law
without the state’s consent.4 7 More broadly, Printz seemed to depart from the
post-New Deal consensus that the Tenth Amendment was not an independent
obstacle to actions otherwise within the power of Congress.48 Likewise, in Alden v.
Maine, the Court held that the history and structure of the Constitution —
“confirmed” by the Tenth Amendment—prevented the federal government from
subjecting non-consenting states to private damages suits in their own courts for
violations of federal law. 4 9 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court fatally
undermined its 1990 decision in Walton v. Arizona and revolutionized sentencing
law with an originalist holding that any fact that increased a defendant’s sentence
Witty. Since his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia has
been described as all of these things and for good reason.” Id. at inside cover.
43
See, e.g., NRO Symposium, Bring a Book to the Beach , NAT’ L RE V. ON LINE , July 1,
2005, http://search.nationalreview.com/ (enter “bring a book to the beach” in Search Terms and
click on Search; follow “Bring a Book to the Beach” hyperlink).
44
Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Dec. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6646457/.
45
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. RE V . 611,
620 −21 (1999).
46
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 371 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47
See 521 U.S. 898, 905−10 (1997).
48
See id . at 942 −43 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
123 −24 (1941).
49
527 U.S. 706, 713−15 (1999).
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beyond the statutory maximum for his underlying offense had to be submitted to a
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.50 More recently, in Crawford v.
Washington , Justice Scalia wrote an opinion holding, based on the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, that testimonial hearsay was inadmissible in
criminal trials where defendants are not granted the right to confrontation and
cross-examination.5 1 Crawford overruled the Court’s decision in Ohio v.
Roberts.52
Finally, of course, there is Heller. Justice Scalia’s brazenly originalist
opinion in that case owes a debt not just to Marshall (as Scalia might have it) but
to Meese. It could not have been written thirty years earlier; doctrinaire
originalism was not then a politically acceptable judicial philosophy. The next
Part discusses the uses of originalism in Second Amendment doctrine. It
demonstrates that, although Heller itself is pointedly originalist, the future of the
Second Amendment in constitutional law will likely be firmly doctrinal.

II. E VOLVING STANDARDS OF SELF -DEFENSE
Heller was a test case engineered by lawyers at the libertarian Cato
Institute and the Institute for Justice in the wake of dramatic shifts in elite opinion
in favor of an individual rights view of the Second Amendment.53 Dick Heller is a
libertarian activist and a security guard at the Federal Judicial Center, which sits
less than a half mile away from the Supreme Court building and serves in part as
an annex for the Supreme Court’s library. From 1976 until Heller was decided,
Washington, D.C. had among the strictest gun control laws in the country,
essentially prohibiting possession of handguns, requiring that all other guns be
either unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock, and preventing Dick
Heller from registering a gun for use in his D.C. home.5 4
Prior to Heller, the Court’s Second Amendment precedents were few and
far between but were generally unfavorable to the claim that the Amendment
protects the right of an individual unaffiliated with an organized militia to carry a
gun for self -defense. The Court held in Presser v. Illinois that the State of Illinois
could forbid unofficial militias without offense to the Second Amendment,
although the Court’s statements as to the scope of the Amendment were
530 U.S. 466, 482−84 (2000). Walton , 497 U.S. 639 (1990), was later overruled on the
authority of Apprendi. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2003).
51
541 U.S. 36, 53−54 (2004).
52
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
53
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Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HAR V. L. RE V. 191, 226−236 (2008).
54
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008).
50

11

technically dicta. 55 More to the point, in the 1939 case of United States v. Miller,
the Court unanimously affirmed the indictment of two men accused of carrying an
unregistered sawed-off shotgun across state lines in violation of the National
Firearms Act. 5 6 A whiff of sarcasm attends Justice McReynolds’s statement that
“[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of ‘a
shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument.”5 7 It wasn’t so much that sawed -off shotguns had no
military use—of course they do —but that they were the preferred weapons of
bank robbers, which the defendants Jack Miller and Frank Layton most assuredly
were. 58 As the government’s brief stated, “sawed -off shotguns, sawed -off rifles,
and machine guns[] clearly have no legitimate use in the hands of private
individuals but, on the contrary, frequently constitute the arsenal of the gangster
and the desperado.”5 9
Miller is a sloppy mess of an opinion. It is best read to hold that, whatever
the scope of the Second Amendment, it does not protect the right of career
criminals to arm themselves with their weapons of choice. This is a delicate reed
on which to build a jurisprudence, but until 2001 every Court of Appeals to
consider whether the Second Amendment protected the right to bear arms held
that the scope of the right is moored to militia service. 60 The Supreme Court itself
said in dicta that the federal felon -in-possession statute does not “trench upon any
constitutionally protected liberties,” and it cited to Miller, which the Court took to
hold that “the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm
that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia.’”61 This all led Justice Stevens to state in his Heller
dissent that “hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the [Second]
Amendment we endorsed [in Miller],” and that the Court itself “affirmed it in
1980.” 6 2
At its purest, originalism is competitive with stare decisis, and, true to
form, Justice Scalia dismissed the authority of the Miller line of cases with
116 U.S. 252, 264−65 (1886). The Court held, relying on United States v. Cruikshank ,
92 U.S. 542 (1875), that the Second Amendment is a restriction on Congress, not the states. Id. at
265.
56
307 U.S. 174, 183 (1939).
57
Id . at 178.
58
See Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIB ER TY 48, 48 (2008).
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startling alacrity. For our purposes, more significant than his particular reasons for
rejecting Miller and its progeny is the relatively little weight he placed on those
precedents and any reliance those cases might have generated. Justice Stevens
discussed the weight of precedent on the second page of his opinion; Justice
Scalia’s discussion comes on the twenty -sixth page of his. Scalia devoted the
preceding twenty-five pages to a thorough examination of the text and history of
the Second Amendment in an effort to glean the original meaning of what he
termed the “operative” clause—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.” 63 So fastidious was Justice Scalia’s devotion to the legal
authority of the original meaning of this clause that he was unmoved by his own
concession that the “prefatory” clause—“a well-regulated militia, being necessary
to the security of a free state”—announces that the Amendment’s original purpose
was military related. 64 This preference for meaning over purpose is consistent
with Justice Scalia’s announced devotion to original meaning over original
intent.6 5
Justice Stevens’s opinion was history -laden as well, leading some to
declare that he, too, had taken the red pill of originalism.66 As I have discussed in
other work, that interpretation over-reads his historicism, which is directed not at
original meaning but at original purpose. So understood, the approach is broadly
consistent with Justice Stevens’s prior judicial work. 67 But even if Justice Stevens
was a temporary convert in Heller, there is little reason to expect a permanent
transformation in future Second Amendment cases. Indeed, there is little reason to
expect a majority of the Court, perhaps including Justice Scalia, to hold firm to
originalism as Second Amendment doctrine evolves.
Consider first the rule announced in Heller itself. The Court did not
endorse an unqualified right of indiv iduals to carry guns. Rather, the Court stated
without analysis that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications
on the commercial sale of arms.” 68 Moreover, Justice Scalia wrote, the category
of weapons protected by the Second Amendment is limited to those “in common
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use.” 69 Handguns quintessentially qualify because they are “the most popular
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.”70
Neither of the Court’s prescriptions with respect to two of the big debates
that will follow the Heller decis ion—which restrictions and which weapons—rely
on the original understanding of the Second Amendment. We can expect future
courts faced with gun control statutes to reason by analogy, in the manner of the
common law judge, from the Court’s ipse dixit endorsement of felon -inpossession statutes, bans on carrying in schools and government buildings, and
commercial regulations. To the chagrin of many in the gun rights community, the
dozens of lower court opinions rejecting Heller-based challenges to all manner of
gun control laws, from concealed weapons bans to misdemeanant-in-possession
laws, have reasoned largely by analogy to Justice Scalia’s list of permissible
regulations.7 1 As Judge Copenhaver wrote in United States v. Chafin —which
addressed the constitutionality of the federal ban on possessing a gun while using
or addicted to controlled substances—“ Heller sanctioned some well- rooted,
public-safety-based exceptions to the Second Amendment right that appear
consistent with Congress’ determination that those unlawfully using or addicted to
controlled substances should not have firearms at the ready.”7 2 Indeed, the case
arising from the changes made to D.C. laws post-Heller, filed by none other than
Dick Heller, will likely be resolved through careful examination of the Heller
opinion, not through historical inquiry. 7 3 It is, to coin a phrase, “the common law
returned.”74
The challenge to the D.C. machine gun ban also may test the second big
debate likely to emerge from Heller : which weapons may be prohibited. Lower
courts that have considered whether Heller permits machine gun bans have
uniformly held that it does. Most prominently, the Eighth Circuit held, relying on
Heller, that such weapons “fall within the category of dangerous and unusual
weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use.” 75 This has always
69

Id . at 2817.
Id . at 2818.
71
See Adam Liptak, Few Ripples from Supreme Court Ruling on Guns, N.Y. T IM ES , Mar.
16, 2009, at A14; Winkler, supra note 3, at 15–16.
72
United States v. Chafin, No. 2:08-00129, slip op. at 2 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 18, 2008).
73
See Amended Complaint, Heller v. District of Columbia, No. 1:08 -cv-01289 (D. D.C.
July 29, 2008). The changes made include a self-defense exception to the handgun ban, a
prohibition on semi-automatic guns, and an exception to the trigger lock and safe storage law for a
“reasonably perceived threat of immediate harm.”
74
AN TONIN SC AL IA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A M ATTER OF
IN TERP RE TATION : FEDER AL COUR TS AND THE L AW 3, 38 (1997).
75
United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Gilbert, No. 07-30153, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15209, at *2 (9th Cir. July 15, 2008) (rejecting the
defendant’s objection to a jury instruction stating that he had no Second Amendment right to
possess a machine guns or a short-barreled rifle); Hamblen v. United States, No. 3:08-1034, 2008
70

14

been a tricky subject for many Second Amendment originalists. If the original
purpose behind the Second Amendment was to ensure the effectiveness of the
militia, keeping the Amendment fresh would seem to support a right to keep and
bear hand grenades and anti-tank missiles, or at the very least an M16 assault rifle,
which is standard issue in the United States military. That reading becomes even
more compelling if one ridicules the argument—as Justice Scalia did —that only
founding era weapons are protected by the Second Amendment.76 If the scope of
the Amendment is informed by neither its original purpose nor its original
meaning, then originalism is doing precious little work in crafting a decision rule.
Justice Scalia’s solution is to protect the right to keep and bear the modern day
equivalent of the sorts of weapons used in eighteenth -century militias, namely
those in common use.7 7 That is to say, Justice Scalia, who is unwilling to adopt an
evolving standards of decency test for the meaning of “cruel and unusual
punishments” in the Eighth Amendment, is downright eager to adopt an evolving
standards of self-defense test for the meaning of “arms” in the Second
Amendment.
The other big question in the wake of Heller—whether the Second
Amendment is incorporated against the states—will likely be answered in the
affirmative, and sooner rather than later. The Heller majority broadcast that result
loudly and clearly twice in its opinion. First, in discussing United States v.
Cruikshank, which held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states,
the Heller Court added a gratuitous footnote noting that Cruikshank “also said
that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not engage in
the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.” 78 Second,
the Heller Court mounted its case in favor of an individual rights view by
referring to the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment in which Senator
Pomeroy described the right to bear arms for self -defense as an “indispensable . . .
safeguard[] of liberty,” 79 and Senator Nye suggested that the right was implicit in
United States citizenship. 80
As with the questions of “which restrictions” and “which weapons,” the
incorporation question is not likely to be decided on originalist grounds. As the
Court’s footnote on Cruikshank indicates, incorporation analysis follows a
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98682, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2008) (holding that the defendant had no
Second Amendment right to possess a machine gun); cf. United States v. Perkins, No. 4:08 CR
3064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72892, at *1 (D. Neb. Sept. 12, 2008) (holding that the defendant
had no Second Amendment right to possess a silencer).
76
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doctrinal prescription. The standard formulation mandates selective incorporation
of those Bill of Rights guarantees that the Court deems “fundamental.”8 1 This
route to incorporation is more treacherous than an originalist one. The Court has
conspicuously refused to decide whether the Fifth Amendment right to a grand
jury or the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury clears the bar of
fundamentality;82 what is to prevent five Justices from holding that the Second
Amendment is significant but not that significant? By contrast, the best evidence
of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it incorporates
not “fundamental rights” per se but rather the then-recognized privileges and
immunities of citizenship.83 There is ample evidence that the right to keep and
bear arms qualified as of 1866. 84
It is natural, of course, that elaboration of a constitutional guarantee
initially mined through originalism would proceed doctrinally. That pattern is
evident in the sentencing revolution, whose major constitutional landmarks since
Apprendi —Blakely v. Washington85 and United States v. Booker86 —contained not
a whit of historical analysis. The same is true of the Confrontation Clause cases.
Although Crawford was thoroughly originalist, its progeny Davis v. Washington
relied on “our own Confrontation Clause jurisprudence” to define “testimonial”
statements.8 7 More recently, the Court relied on original understanding to
determine that a defendant does not forfeit his Confrontation Clause rights when
his own wrongful acts cause the unavailability of the witness in question.88 But
there the Court was merely following its own instruction in Crawford to permit
only those exceptions to the right of confrontation that were recognized at the
founding. 8 9 We can expect an analogous but even less historically sensitive future
for Heller’s posterity: careful, incremental analysis whose essential reference is
not the founding but rather Heller itself.

III. ORIGINALISM’S FUTURE
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Part II demonstrated that, for all its originalist bells and whistles, Heller
has a conventional future in store. It will not, in the way of Lochner v. New York
or Trop v. Dulles, have a methodological progeny that fundamentally, or even
subtly, alters the way we think about unearthing constitutional rights.90 Rather, in
the way of Trop , its future will be the evolutionary stuff of the common law,
liable over time to slink away from the original understanding of the amendment
it seeks to interpret. This Part will show that originalist decisions are practically
bound to follow this pattern in case law, and that their other lifeline—politics—
has practically dried up.
It would be deeply unsettling for originalism never to play nice with stare
decisis. As the Court has said, “[N]o judicial system could do society’s work if it
eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it . . . . [T]he very concept of the
rule of law underlying our Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” 91 Justice Scalia dissented
vociferously from the application of that sentiment to the case just quoted,92 but in
his quieter moments he has suggested substantial agreement with the general
principle. Justice Scalia is what he himself has described as a “faint-hearted”
originalist, one who recognizes the need to “adulterate [originalism] with the
doctrine of stare decisis.” 93 And his fain t-heartedness does not just extend to cases,
like Blakely and Davis, that he agrees with anyway. For example, he seems
unsympathetic with Justice Thomas’s apparent willingness to restore the
Commerce Clause to its neutered pre-New Deal state. 94 Justice Scalia is also
willing to apply dormant commerce clause jurisprudence even though he regards
it as “an unjustified judicial invention,”95 and he has swallowed hard and applied
punitive damages doctrine that he disagrees with. 96
This posture is understandable, perhaps even compelled by the norms of
the judicial role, but faint-hearted originalism by its nature carries an expiration
date. For originalism of this sort to continue to prosper it needs to feed continually
90
Although heightened means-ends scrutiny for violations of unenumerated liberty rights
did not originate with Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Lochner is by far its most prominent early
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on issues of first impression, and those cases are hard to come by. As originalist
scholar Randy Barnett said of Heller, “This may be one of the only cases in our
lifetime when the Supreme Court is going to be interpreting the meaning of an
important provision of the Constitution unencumbered by preced ent.”97 Justice
Stevens would beg to differ as to this characterization of Heller, but the point
stands that it is rare for the Supreme Court these days to interpret a constitutional
provision on which it has not already spoken. The Third Amendment comes
readily to mind, but most issues the Court has not touched are those it considers
judicially untouchable, such as political questions involving, for example, war
powers, impeachments, the Guarantee Clause, and the like. Without a steady diet
of these sorts of cases, the faint-hearted originalist morphs into the cantankerous
doctrinalist.
Perhaps I have been too quick, however. In the age of the discretionary
Supreme Court docket, is it not true that every Supreme Court constitutional case
is either one of first impression or a reconsideration —and potential repudiation—
of prior precedent? The typical Court case may not involve an issue like the
Second Amendment, on which it has said nothing of significance for sixty -nine
years, but the Court generally is looking to clarify its prior pronouncements and,
incidentally or intentionally, extend doctrine this way or that. In doing so, it is not
uncommon for the Court to rely, in part at least, on the original understanding of a
relevant constitutional provision. But if that is originalism, then we are indeed all
originalists now and always have been. If instead originalism embraces the notion
that, notwithstanding precedent, there is something dispositive about the original
understanding, then it remains a rare breed of constitutional interpretive theory.
A difficulty remains. Have we not recently seen originalism in action in
cases that were not matters of first impression, such as Printz and Alden and
Apprendi and Crawford?9 8 How do we know that an originalist turn is not
forthcoming in other areas of constitutional law we now believe to be settled, such
as the selective incorporation doctrine? I would caution against referring to the
four opinions just mentioned as wholly originalist. It is surely wrong, for example,
to attribute Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Apprendi or Justice Breyer’s
majority vote in Crawford to a preference for originalism. 99 That said, one must
admit the possibility that the Court will surprise us with a truly originalist
97
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repudiation of prior doctrine, such as the reinvigoration of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.100
But in the nature of surprises, this seems rather unlikely in the near future.
The reason relates to the nature of faint-hearted originalism. In theory, it means
that one’s willingness to be originalist varies inversely with the fortitude of the
doctrinal infrastructure in one’s path, but in Justice Scalia’s hands it has meant
adhering to originalism in a superficially meandering pattern. More than
originalism, Scalia’s formalist preference for rules over standards and guidelines
best explains Apprendi and Crawford.101 Indeed, that preference outright
predominates over originalism in affirmative action cases.102 This is not so much
faint-hearted as selective originalism; it is deployed or reserved based not on the
weight of contrary precedent but on the substantive values of the judge.
What, then, is left for Justice Scalia to be selectively originalist about? As
discussed, the Second Amendment’s future is solidly doctrinal, and it was one of
the few areas of constitutional first impression in which judicial review was likely.
The Court has already nudged some of its federalism jurisprudence in an arguably
originalist direction,10 3 but the current Court appears disinclined to go much
further.104 Even for issues on which Justice Scalia might take an originalist
position—extraterritorial habeas rights, say —on which of those issues are there
five votes for an originalist opinion? Justice Thomas is a generally reliable
originalist vote, but Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both suggested during
their confirmation hearings that they are not originalists, 1 05 and neither has
demonstrated strong originalist tendencies on the bench. They were nominated
and confirmed in a climate in which the conservative constitutional cause du jour
was not abortion or gay rights or school prayer but rather executive power, and, if
anything, originalism favors a weak executive over a strong one. 106 If any other
theme has emerged from the votes of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, it is
100
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an apparent hostility to litigation 1 07 —continuing the views of their predecessors—
and on this issue there is no evidence that either Justice is substantially motivated
by respect for original understandings. Justice Kennedy, the last of the Heller
majority, has never been an originalist and disagrees with Justice Scalia as often
as not in divided cases.10 8 The other four current members of the Court are not
only non -originalists, but they disagree with Justice Scalia more than they agree
with him in divided cases. 1 09
Politics, moreover, does not favor originalism. President Obama will
likely appoint at least two justices, and perhaps three or four if he is elected to a
second term. It is improbable that any of his federal court nominees will be
originalists. Obama took office with a strongly Democratic Congress and an
agenda—fiscal stimulus, energy, education and health care reform, and the
restoration of the country’s global reputation —that is not obviously destined for
an originalist constitutional challenge. Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have
written that large-scale changes in constitutional doctrine result from so -called
“partisan entrenchment,” the gradual stocking of the judiciary by members of a
107
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dominant political party. 1 10 Over time, doctrine begins to reflect the ideological
commitments of that party. President Obama seems temperamentally better suited
to entrench pragmatists than ideologues.111 The most likely identifiable
methodological commitment of his judicial nominees will be to the incorporation
of contemporary international and transnational legal norms into constitutional
adjudication. That is nothing if not originalism’s opposite.112
Politics and case law are interrelated. As Part I sought to demonstrate,
originalism is a historically contingent set of rhetorical demands.1 13 Its recent
iteration has been an instrument of the restorative politics President Reagan
inspired, but its juris-generative life may have ended with Heller and the election
of President Obama. Originalism’s last refuge is the academy, where it continues
to thrive, albeit in stylized form. It remains interesting to theorize about the
democratic bona fides of temporally extended commitments,114 to ponder the
relationship between the authority of original authorial intentions and fidelity to
the author’s language, 1 15 and to take an external perspective on the process by
which a jurisprudence succeeds politically through a set of culturally resonant
ethical claims.116 Moreover, so long as there is a place in the academy for
historians, and for thoughtful revisionism, there will be room for originalists. But
for the foreseeable future, the debate over originalism is likely to remain
academic.
If all I have said is correct, it has important implications for progressive
lawyering. Democrats currently control two branches of government and have the
opportunity to shape the third; Republican political elites no longer focus
centrally on social issues; and originalism is, and will likely remain, “fainthearted” in practice. For these reasons, the originalism movement that has
dominated constitutional discourse for the last three decades is in decline and is
not likely to produce significant victories in constitutional cases. There has
nevertheless been significant interest from progressive lawyers and academics in
emphasizing the liberal implications of a serious examination of original
understandings. Balkin has prominently advocated a version of “liberal”
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originalism that manipulates the level of generality at which one assesses the
original meaning of constitutional provisions.117 James Ryan and Douglas Kendall
have expressly advocated cooptation of originalist methods to liberal ends.118 And
Kendall, whose Constitutional Accountability Center is devoted to “fulfilling the
progressive promise of our Constitution’s text and history,” has filed a brief in
McDonald v. City of Chicago , which challenges Chicago’s gun control laws,
arguing that the Second Amendment is incorporated against the states by way of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause.11 9
These efforts emerge from a defensive crouch that, while understandable
in 2008, may no longer be appropriate in 2009. The substantive progressive
agenda to be served by an emphasis on originalism might well include continued
protection for, among other things, abortion rights, affirmative action, and broad
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is
difficult to imagine what more is to be gained. Dangers, by contrast, include
legitimizing conservative views on gun control, on a host of social issues, on
religious establishment, on capital punishment, sentencing policy, and prisoners’
rights, and on the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Reliance on
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the path of incorporation could have
disturbing implications, moreover, for resident aliens and undocumented
immigrants, whom the text of the Clause excludes from its protection.
This Essay’s argument implies that, rather than giving originalism the
oxygen that conservatives are decreasingly likely to supply, progressives are
better off emphasizing more dynamic rhetoric. When change is “in,” why not
glorify our Constitution’s impressive ability to adapt to a changing world —to
embrace its future rather than its past? In an era of global competition,
foreclosures, bailouts, and outsized executive bonuses, why not argue that our
Constitution protects a right to a living wage, to a decent education, to adequate
housing?1 20 Why not ride an ethical wave away from naked individualism and
toward mutual responsibility? Why not emphasize that our Constitution is limited
not by the historical understandings of its framers and ratifiers but by our own
generation’s ambition, energy, and imagination? Conservatives have
demonstrated that reorienting constitutional rights toward one’s preferred political
orientation is a generations-long process. If begun too timidly, the process can and
will run out of gas.
117
118

See Balkin, supra note 12, at 293.
See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, Liberal Reading , NEW REP UBLIC , Aug. 6,

2007, at 14.
119

See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal,
McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08 -4241 (7th Cir. Feb. 4, 2009).
120
As President Obama has himself implied, constitutionalizing affirmative rights need
not necessarily mean judicializing them. See Odyssey: The Court and Civil Rights (WBEZ radio
broadcast Jan. 18, 2001), available at http://apps.wbez.org/blog/?p=639.

22

CONCLUSION
This Essay has suggested that, if originalism has won, its victory may be
bittersweet. The idea that the original understanding of constitutional provisions
should be dispositive has been at the periphery of constitutional law since at least
the New Deal era. In recent years originalism has lived on occasionally in the
Court’s cases but more stridently in conservative popular culture and judicial
politics. As the Reagan and Meese judicial agenda fades into history and a
Democratic political era dawns, the prospects for future originalist triumphs are
bleak.
For now, at least. We do not know the precise form it will take—history,
after all, is “merely a list of surprises” 121 —but we can be sure that originalism
will be back. It will reemerge, as it always has, when a political constituency
issues a call for constitutional restoration following an era of constitutional flux. It
will breathe life into the words of Aldous Huxley, that “from age to age, nothing
changes and yet everything is completely different.” 122
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